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ZAFAR IQBAL 
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the impact of foreign capital inflows on 
government’s fiscal behaviour in Pakistan. Government’s fiscal response is measured in 
terms of social, non-development, and development expenditures as well as revenues. This 
paper specifies and estimates a fiscal behaviour model for the period 1976–95. The three-
stage least squares results suggest that foreign capital flows into the public sector have strong 
positive impact on social and non-development expenditures and, in contrast to what the 
government and donor agencies believe, have little effect on development spending. In other 
words, proceeds from foreign loans and aid are largely consumed rather than invested 
productively. The results also reveal the strong substitutable interdependence between social 
and non-development expenditures. Furthermore, the finding clearly demonstrates that 
foreign assistance causes a strong shift of public domestic resources from development 
projects to non-development activities. In addition to the above, the results show that a large 
fraction of government revenues is used to finance social and non-development 
expenditures. The results also demonstrate that foreign assistance enhances taxation efforts 
of the Government of Pakistan. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Economists began about 40 years ago to map the linkages between foreign aid 
and economic activities (e.g., investment, saving, and economic growth) for developing 
countries. Gradually, their analysis has become more sophisticated. The development of 
the two-gap models [for example, Chenery and Bruno (1962); McKinnon (1964); 
Chenery and Strout (1966); Adelman and Chenery (1966); Chenery and McEwan 
(1966); Landau (1971) and Weisskopf (1972, 1972a), among others] was an important 
contribution to the literature of economic development. The central idea of the two-gap 
analysis is that foreign aid can serve as a means of breaking the bottlenecks, thereby 
permitting fuller utilisation of all resources and a continuation of development in an 
economy. Two-gap models, however, have been subject to a number of general 
criticisms, some directed more specifically at their application to analysing the impact 
of foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries. For example, Bruton 
(1969); Griffin and Enos (1970); Findlay (1973); Voivodas (1973) and Mosley (1980) 
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all argued that foreign aid can impede rather than facilitate development in recipient 
countries. More recently, two-gap models have been extended into three-gap models 
[for example, Bacha (1990); Taylor (1990, 1990a, 1993, 1994); Solimano (1990) and 
Iqbal (1995, 1996)], adding a fiscal constraint to the traditional foreign-exchange 
constraint and savings constraint as a third gap limiting the growth prospects of highly 
indebted developing economies. The fiscal gap takes into account the fiscal limitations 
on policy choice that have become crucial in many developing economies. In such 
cases, the fiscal constraint is intended to reflect potential limitations on the availability 
of resources to finance the public investment that may be required to support a given 
level of output. Two-gap and three-gap models, however, have been mainly criticised 
because of one strong assumption common to both that foreign assistance provides a 
one-to-one increment to the capital stock, as there is a range of mechanisms through 
which foreign aid may displace domestic capital formation and enhance domestic 
consumption in recipient countries. 
Another recent advancement in aid literature is the analysis about the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on government’s fiscal behaviour in developing countries. 
For example, empirical studies by Heller (1975); Mosley et al. (1987); McGuire (1987); 
Gang and Khan (1986, 1991, 1994); Khilji and Zampelli (1991); Pack and Pack (1990, 
1993); Khan and Hoshino (1992) and White (1993, 1994), among others, are important 
contributions to this topic. However, all these studies come to conflicting conclusions 
about the effectiveness of foreign assistance in terms of the public sector’s fiscal 
behaviour. Proponents and opponents of foreign aid have each produced evidence to 
support their own particular point of view. In general, these studies explicitly recognise 
that foreign aid reduces taxation efforts and is substituted between public investment 
and public consumption. I believe, however, that this evidence is flawed because of 
some theoretical and methodological shortcomings. This paper aims to contribute not 
only to the general debate on how the effects of foreign aid might be evaluated but also 
to the specific debate on the effect of foreign aid on the public sector’s fiscal behaviour 
in Pakistan.  
This analysis is chosen because of the ongoing hot debate between the aid-donor 
agencies and the policy-makers in Pakistan. It has policy implications not only for the 
government’s foreign borrowing strategy but also for its fiscal policy. Like most 
developing countries, the role of the public sector in economic activities has been 
considerable in Pakistan. Moreover, increases in taxes have become increasingly 
difficult for the public decision-makers because of economic cost and political 
resistance by the masses. The existing literature has paid little attention to the impact of 
foreign aid on fiscal behaviour in the case of Pakistan. To my knowledge, there is only 
one study, by Khilji and Zampelli (1991), which is built upon McGuire’s work on 
Israel, testing the fungibility hypothesis for Pakistan. Taking time-series data for the 
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period 1960–86 and using full information maximum likelihood, the study found that 
both US military and non-military aid to Pakistan were fully transferred into fungible 
resources with an impact on public spending less significant than expected.  
This paper, however, diverges from Khilji and Zampelli and the other 
aforementioned studies on this topic for five reasons. First, it presents systematic fiscal 
accounts of the public sector. Second, contrary to Khilji and Zampelli, this paper 
disaggregates government’s total expenditure into three main components, namely, non-
development expenditure, social expenditure, and development expenditure. It is 
worthwhile to note that in this paper social expenditure is treated as public investment 
on human capital because it mainly includes government’s expenditures on education 
and health. Third, we provide an accurate judgement of the targeted fiscal variables 
fixed by the policy-makers; no one has bothered to collect the necessary data before. 
Fourth, this paper re-specifies the loss function adopted by the policy-makers and 
develops a simple macroeconomic fiscal framework. Furthermore, we use an iterative 
three-stage least squares procedure to estimate the simultaneous equations model.1 
Finally, this paper uses the latest available consistent time-series data for the period 
1976–95 of an individual country (Pakistan) as the empirical aid literature [for example, 
Riddell (1987); Mosley (1987); Pack and Pack (1990, 1993) and Gang and Khan 
(1991)] emphasise the need for time-series analysis of individual countries (instead of 
cross-section countries) to draw concrete and country-specific policy implications. In 
sum, this paper overcomes the limitations of earlier empirical literature on this topic and 
provides more reliable estimates with improved methodological framework using 
consistent time-series data for the period 1976–1995 in the case of Pakistan. The rest of 
the paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains how the budget constraint is derived. 
At the same time, this section develops the fiscal behaviour model for Pakistan. Section 
III briefly describes the data. Section IV estimates the model and interprets the results. 
The final section concludes the main findings, with some policy implications.   
 
II.  THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND THE 
FISCAL BEHAVIOUR MODEL 
 
The Budget Constraint 
This section, with its main goals to derive the budget constraint and to develop 
the fiscal behaviour model for the public sector in Pakistan, disaggregates the combined 
account of domestic economy into three main institutions: the private sector, the public 
sector, and the rest of the world. These accounts are reported in Table 1, which provides 
a complete picture of financial interdependence and the interactions among the private 
sector, the public sector, and the rest of the world. It shows how savings are allocated to 
investment within a sector and how the surplus capital is transferred to the other sectors. 
1The iterative three-stage least squares procedure is asymptotically full information maximum 
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In accordance  with  accounting  principles, the total of each row in Table 1 must 
be equal to the total of its corresponding column. In the flow-of-funds block—capital 
accounts of the institutions—each column represents lending by the concerned sector, 
while each row represents the borrowing by the concerned sector from the other sectors. 
The first row of Table 1 refers to total funds of the private sector, which includes its 
own savings (Sp), capital transfers from the rest of the world (Fp), and repayment of 
internal loans by the public sector (Rp). The corresponding column indicates that these 
funds are used for the private sector’s own investment (IP), the capital transferred to the 
public sector (SSp) through purchasing public bonds, currency issued by the 
government, other direct and indirect loans to the public sector, and capital flight (KF) 
to the rest of the world. The capital flight defined in this paper is the errors and 
omissions in the balance of payments—assuming, as we are, that these errors are 
attributed to the private sector, since the public sector keeps a formal record of all 
transactions made with the rest of the world.  
Row 2 in Table 1 represents total funds available to the public sector, which 
includes its own revenues (T), capital transferred from the rest of the world (Fg), and 
capital transferred from the private sector (SSp). Total uses of these funds are reported in 
the corresponding column 2, which indicates that the public sector utilises its funds for 
non-development expenditure (Cg), social expenditure (SEg) and development 
expenditure (Dg), [which are equal to aggregate public expenditures (G)], and 
repayments of domestic loans to the private sector (Rp); the balancing item is net 
changes in official foreign exchange reserves (∆R) recorded in the balance of payments 
of the domestic economy. Finally, the total available funds and their uses by the rest of 
the world are reported in row 3 and column 3, respectively. The total available funds to 
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the rest of the world are their own exports, which are imports of the domestic economy 
(M), net changes in the foreign exchange reserves, and private capital flight. The total 
uses of these funds account for capital transferred to the private sector (Fp), capital 
transferred to the public sector (Fg), and exports of the domestic economy (X). Figure 1 
depicts how the public sector’s deficit is financed through capital transferred from the 





















Fig. 1.  Financing of the Public Sector’s Deficit. 
 
Surplus of the private sector: Rp + Fp + Sp – Ip – KF   =   SSp … … (1) 
                + 
Surplus of the ROW: KF + ∆R + M – X –  Fp   =   Fg … … (2) 
                = 
Deficit of the public sector: G – T   =   (Fg–∆R) + (SSp–Rp) 
 or  
 (Cg + SEg + Dg) – T   =   NFg  + NSSp … (3) 
 
The above Equations (1)–(3) must satisfy the budget constraint for any time-
period. Equation (3) reveals that the public sector’s budget deficit is partially financed 
by domestic net capital transferred from the private sector (NSSp) redefined as (SSp–Rp) 
and the remaining deficit through the net capital transferred from the rest of the world 

















systematic way of formulating the budget constraint for the public sector. Rewriting 
Equation (3) gives: 
 Cg + SEg + Dg  =  NSSp + T + NFg ... ... ... (4) 
 
The budget constraint given in Equation (4) can be decomposed into two sub-
constraints reflecting the alternative uses of the public sector revenues and net foreign 
capital inflows in the following way: 
 Dg = NSSp + (1–µ1)T + (1–µ2)NFg ... ... ... (5) 
 Cg + SEg = µ1T + µ2NFg ... ... ... (6) 
 
The first constraint given in Equation (5) shows that public development 
expenditure can be financed partly by public revenue, domestic borrowing, and foreign 
loans. (1–µ1) and (1–µ2) are the respective fractions of public revenue and net foreign 
capital inflows going to development expenditure. Following Heller (1975); Gang and 
Khan (1986, 1991, 1994) and Khan and Hoshino (1992), the rationale for two budget 
constraints is based on a strong assumption that government does not use domestic 
borrowing to finance non-development expenditures.2 The second constraint given in 
Equation (6) reflects the µ1 proportion of public revenue and µ2 proportion of net 
foreign capital inflows used for public current and socio-economic expenditures. Both 
the budget constraints are the nucleus of the following fiscal behaviour model for 
Pakistan. 
 
The Fiscal Behaviour Model 
Following Mosley et al. (1987); Binh and McGillivray (1993) and White (1993, 
1994), we take the commonly used quadratic loss function adopted by the policy-
makers in developing countries:3 
 
 U = α0 – α1/2(Dg – D*g)2 – α2/2(SEg – SE*g)2 – α3/2(Cg – C*g)2 – α4/2(T – T*)2 – 
  α5/2(NSSp – NSS*p)2 ... ... ... ... (7) 
 
where αi ≥ 0 for all i and the variables with asterisks represent the target variables (i.e., 
C*g for non-development expenditure, SE*g for socio-economic expenditure, D*g for 
development expenditure, NSS*p for net domestic borrowing, and T* for total revenue) 
that policy-makers plan to meet. The functional form given in Equation (7) reflects 
2The assumption that the government does not use domestic borrowing to finance non-development 
expenditures is obviously not correct for Pakistan. The government has consistently resorted to domestic 
borrowing from the banking system and the private sector to cover its fiscal deficit. For further analysis in the 
area, this assumption needs to be relaxed. 
3For other alternative utility loss functions, see Heller (1975); Khilji and Zampelli (1991); Gang and 
Khan (1991) and Khan and Hoshino (1992).   
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diminishing marginal utility for each of the variables Dg, SEg, Cg, and NSSp as they rise 
above their target levels and by the specific set of α parameters for each variable. This 
loss function implies that the farther the observed variables from the respective desired 
target variables, the lower the level of government utility. In this paper, policy-makers 
in Pakistan are assumed to maximise the objective function reported in Equation (7), 
subject to budget constraints given in Equations (5) and (6) in the following lagrangean 
way:   
 
 max V = α0 – α1/2(Dg – D*g)2 – α2/2(SEg – SE*g)2 – α3/2(Cg – C*g)2 – α4/2(T – T*)2 – 
 a5/2(NSSp – NSS*p)2 + λ1[Dg – NSSp – (1–µ1)T – (1–µ2)NFg] + λ2[Cg + 
 SEg – µ1T – µ2 NFg] ... ... ... ... (8) 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
 ∂V/∂Dg =  –α1(Dg – D*g) + λ1 = 0 ... ... ... (9) 
 ∂V/∂SEg = –α2(SEg – SE*g) +λ2 = 0 ... ... ... (10) 
 ∂V/∂Cg = –α3(Cg – C*g) +λ2 = 0 ... ... ... (11) 
 ∂V/∂T = –α4(T – T*) –λ1(1–µ1) – µ1λ2  = 0 ... ... ... (12) 
 ∂V/∂NSSp = –α5(NSSp – NSS*p) – λ1 = 0 ... ... ... (13) 
  ∂V/∂λ1 = Dg–NSSp – (1–µ1)T – (1–µ2)NFg = 0 .... ... (14) 
 ∂V/∂λ2 = Cg + SEg – µ1T – µ2NFg = 0 ... ... ... (15) 
 
Assuming NSS*p = 0,4 and substituting out the λ’s and rearranging the first-order 
conditions, we get: 
 
SEg = β1SEg* – (1–β1)Cg* + µ1(1–β1)T + µ2(1–β1)NFg ... ... (16) 
 
Cg = (1–β1)Cg* – β1SEg* + β1µ1T + β1µ2NFg ... ... ... (17) 
 
Dg = (1–β2)D*g + β2[(1–µ1)T + (1–µ2)NFg] ... ... ... (18) 
T = β3T* – β4µ1(Cg – C*g) + β5(1–µ1)[Dg – (1–µ2)NFg] ... ... (19) 
 
4Following Heller (1975); Gang and Khan (1991) and Khan and Hoshino (1992), the target public 
sector domestic borrowing is assumed to be zero (i.e. NSS*p = 0) in order to simplify the later analysis. Again, 
this assumption does not seem to be correct for Pakistan. It is often argued that many of Pakistan’s 
macroeconomic problems can be traced to the fact that the government has been unable to keep its domestic 






 β1 = α2/(α2+α3) 
 β2 = α5/(α1+α5) 
 β3 = [α4/α4+α5(1–µ1)2] 
 β4 = [α3/α4+α5(1–µ1)2] 
 β5 = [α5/α4+α5(1–µ1)2]  
 
In the earlier literature on the fiscal behaviour model, one of the main 
shortcomings was the accurate judgement of the desired level of target variables. To 
estimate each target variable, various authors [for example, Heller (1975); Mosley et al. 
(1987); Gang and Khan (1991); Khan and Hoshino (1992) and Gupta and Lensink 
(1995)] specified regression equations relating the actual variables to some instruments. 
The predicted values from these regressions are then used as the target variables. As 
rightly mentioned by Binh and McGillivray (1993) and White (1994), there are two 
problems with this procedure. First, the target variables produced by this approach may 
not be consistent with the budget constraints. The second problem is even more serious, 
if the fitted variable is very closely related to the observed variable (i.e., R2 very close to 
one); this implies that we are regressing observed variable on itself. Alternatively, if the 
R2 is low, it is difficult to see how the fitted values calculated by using the estimated 
coefficients represent the target variables. In fact, no one has bothered to collect the 
necessary data for target variables. Therefore, it appears that the estimates of the budget-
constraint parameters and the other reduced-form parameters based on this approach, 
quite apart from their other shortcomings, can not be treated with much confidence, and 
hence may provide misleading results about the impact of foreign capital inflows on 
government’s fiscal response. To avoid these problems, this study uses the annual 
budget estimates of social expenditure, non-development expenditure, development 
expenditure, and revenues, all representing the targets for the respective variables. 
 
III.   DATA REQUIREMENTS 
Consistent time-series data for the period 1976–95 are taken for the estimation of 
the model of fiscal behaviour in Pakistan. The data set has a unique feature in the sense 
that the matrix format reported in Table 1 is used because of its advantage as a means of 
compiling consistent data. The data sources are primarily the Economic Surveys and the 
Annual Reports of the State Bank of Pakistan. All the data are taken at current market 
prices. A relatively large sample size would seem to be more appropriate, but the 
necessary data, particularly for target variables before 1976, are not readily available. 
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IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Since the model developed in this paper contains simultaneous equations and 
cross-equation restrictions, it suggests the need for a simultaneous-equation estimation 
procedure. Equations (16)–(19) are estimated using a systems-estimation procedure, 
namely, iterative three-stage least squares (ITSL). Using ITSL to simultaneously 
estimate all the equations of a system has two major advantages over equation-by-
equation estimation procedure (i.e., ordinary least squares). First, it is often the case that 
the residuals of various equations in a system are correlated with each other. The ITLS 
procedure takes account of this correlation to improve the efficiency of the coefficients, 
using all the available information in the estimation. Second, if we want to constrain the 
coefficient(s) of one equation to be the same or to be related to the coefficient(s) of the 
other equation(s) in a system, this is only possible if all of the equations are estimated 
jointly to obtain the unique and consistent estimate of the coefficients, which also 
satisfies the cross-equation restrictions. Furthermore, the budget constraints imply that 
Equations (16)–(19) are not independent; therefore, one equation must be omitted in 
estimating the equation system. In this paper, Equation (16) for the public sector social 
expenditure is omitted in the estimation procedure and its coefficients are derived from 
the restrictions in Equation (17).  
Using data for the period 1976–95, three-stage least squares estimates are 
summarised in Tables 2 and 3.5 The estimated equations describe the government’s 
non-development, social and development expenditures, and taxation behaviour in the 
presence of foreign capital flows into the public sector. The results are generally 
satisfactory in the sense that the coefficient signs are mostly as expected and they are 
generally statistically significant. This paper focuses mainly on the impact of foreign 
capital inflows to the public sector on four endogenous fiscal variables, namely, SEg, 
Cg, Dg, and T. More detailed commentary on the results is offered in the following 
paragraphs.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the key parameters of the fiscal behaviour model 
for Pakistan. Estimation of Equations (17 to 19) yields the parameters of budget-
constraint Equations (5) and (6) and reduced-form coefficients (β’s), showing the 
government’s fiscal response during the period under consideration. Estimates of the 
impact of foreign capital inflows on each fiscal variable are then derived and the results 
are reported in Table 3.  Both the budget-constraint parameters, µ1 and µ2, are positive 
and significantly different from zero at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. The 
estimate of µ1 equal to 0.85 indicates that an overwhelming share of government total 
revenues  (i.e., 85 percent)  flows to  social and non-development expenditures. In other 
words, only 15 percent of government revenues are used to finance development 
5It is noted that the gain in efficiency with interative three-stage least squares procedure may be 




projects over the period 1976–95. These estimates also verify the fiscal interdependence  
Table 2 
Iterative 3SLS Key Parameters of the Model 
 Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
 µ1 0.849 5.15!  
 µ2 1.610 2.34!! 
 β1 0.074 1.99!! 
 β2 0.019 0.80 
 β3 0.872 39.61! 
 β4 –0.755 –3.81! 
 β5 1.110 0.71 
Note: ! and !! denote statistically significant at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 
Derived Estimates of Social, Non-development, and Development  
Expenditures, and Revenue Equations 
Social Expenditure Equation 
    SEg = 0.074SE*g – 0.926C*g + 0.786T + 1.491NFg    
 
Non-development Expenditure Equation 
    Cg = 0.926C*g – 0.074SE*g + 0.063T + 0.119NFg    
 
Development Expenditure Equation 
    Dg = 0.981D*g + 0.003T – 0.012NFg       
 
Revenue Equation 
    T = 0.872T* – 0.641(Cg – C*g) + 0.168Dg + 0.102NFg  
 
between the development and the non-development budgets. The other key parameter 
of budget constraint µ2 provides a somewhat startling result. The estimate of µ2 equal to 
1.61 implies that all foreign aid channelled through the public sector is utilised to 
finance social and non-development expenditures. In other words, no foreign aid is used 
to supplement development activities. It is worthwhile to note that the estimated 
coefficient µ2 is greater than unity, implying that when foreign capital flows into the 
public sector are increased, some resources are diverted from development projects to 
social and non-development activities.6 
6Data also show that over time development expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure was 
reduced from 38.3 percent in 1975-76 to 18.2 percent in 1995-96 in Pakistan.
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The estimates of reduced-form parameters β1 to β5 reported in Table 2 show the 
fiscal response of the public sector. The estimate of β1 equal to 0.07 demonstrates that 
setting a lower target for social expenditure leads the public sector to allocate 
proportionally less domestic resources to social projects (i.e., 7 percent) and more to 
non-development expenditure (i.e., 93 percent). In this framework, the results clearly 
show that social expenditure and non-development expenditure are substitutable in the 
government budget. In the development expenditure Equation (18), the estimated β2 
turns out to be positive but statistically insignificant, implying that the trend in 
development expenditure is not affected by any increase in government revenues in the 
presence of foreign aid. However, it seems that development expenditure is closely 
related to its target fixed by the policy-makers in Pakistan. Turning to revenue Equation 
(19), the estimate of β3 equal to 0.87 demonstrates the close link between observed and 
targeted revenues. With regard to β4, if targeted current expenditure exceeds actual 
current expenditure, then with µ1 > 0, β4 < 0 indicates that the current tax burden is 
increased. Alternatively, if targeted current expenditure is less than actual current 
expenditure, then with µ1 > 0, β4 < 0 implies that the current tax burden is reduced. 
However, the negative coefficient of β4 implies that the lower the gap between the 
actual and targeted expenditures, the lesser are the unexpected taxes levied by the tax 
authorities. Finally, the estimated reduced-form coefficient β5 in revenue equation is 
insignificant, suggesting that the revenue decisions of policy-makers are not influenced 
by development considerations. In other words, the revenue decisions are mainly 
influenced by the need to meet social and non-development expenditures. 
The derived estimates of Equations (16–19) are reported in Table 3. Regarding 
social expenditure Equation (16) and non-development expenditure Equation (17), we 
observe that foreign assistance affects social and non-development expenditures 
positively. These results unambiguously demonstrate that foreign aid has a larger 
positive effect on social expenditure than on non-development expenditure. One might 
argue that this result is due to the continuous emphasis of donor agencies, particularly 
the World Bank and the IMF, that foreign aid should be utilised to enhance the 
development of the social sector in Pakistan. Currently, under various Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and the Social Action Programme,7 to improve social 
indicators is a serious concern; these indicators had been very poor in the past. Despite 
achieving a reasonable growth rate in gross domestic product, Pakistan is still lagging 
behind in its social sector. Its social indicators are considerably lower than those of 
7Social Action Programme (SAP) was launched in 1992-93 for five years with the main objectives of 
improving primary education, primary health, female access to education, nutrition, family planning, and rural 
water-supply and sanitation. This programme is being assisted by the World Bank, the International 
Development Association, the Asian Development Bank, as well as by the Netherlands, Japan, and the United 
Nations Children Emergency Fund. Total allocations of resources under SAP have been Rs 33 billion, Rs 41 




some developing countries with comparable per capita incomes. Furthermore, the 
results show that one unit increase in foreign lending leads to a 1.5 unit increase in 
social expenditure. This may be a consequence of the Social Action Programme, where 
the government was committed to provide domestic counterpart to the foreign aid that 
was offered by the foreign donors. With regard to the link between targeted social 
expenditure and actual social expenditure, the result reported in Table 3 shows that 
targeted social expenditure has small effect on the actual level of social expenditure. 
This implies that the government is consistently off-target.  
Turning to the estimates of development expenditure Equation (18) reported in 
Table 3, we see that foreign capital flows have negative impact on development 
expenditure. It seems to confirm our earlier finding that some resources are transferred 
from development projects to social and non-development expenditures when foreign 
aid is increased. Finally, Table 3 shows the effect of foreign capital inflows on 
government revenues. The positive estimate of foreign aid in revenue Equation (19) 
explicates that foreign aid increases government taxation efforts. One explanation might 
be that loans from the foreign donor agencies, particularly from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, are mainly conditional on the government’s raising of 
domestic revenues. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to quantify the relationship between 
foreign capital inflows and government’s fiscal behaviour in Pakistan. This paper, 
however, overcomes the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of other existing 
studies on this topic. The fiscal behaviour model has been estimated by iterative three-
stage least squares technique for the period 1976–95. 
The following major points can be summarised from the empirical analysis. First, 
in terms of the effects of foreign aid on three types of aggregate public expenditure, 
namely, social expenditure, non-development expenditure, and development 
expenditure, the results are truly startling. Corroborative evidence suggests that foreign 
capital flows channelled through the government have a strong positive impact on social 
and non-development expenditures. However, such positive impact accentuates the 
finding that foreign aid has little effect on development expenditure. The results also 
reveal the strong but not fully substitutable interdependence between the social and non-
development expenditures. In addition to the above, the finding clearly demonstrates that 
foreign assistance causes a strong shift of public domestic resources from development 
projects to social and non-development expenditures. Second, the results are quite 
unequivocal in demonstrating that an ample portion of government revenues (i.e., 85 
percent) goes to finance social and non-development expenditures. Third, foreign capital 
flows into the public sector also affect the revenue-raising efforts of the government. The 
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results show that foreign assistance enhances government taxation efforts in Pakistan. 
Some policy implications that can be drawn from these results are dismal. The 
usual argument about the positive and wholly beneficial impact of foreign capital 
inflows on social and non-development expenditures appears to be myopic. Foreign aid 
is not being utilised in the best interest of the country. It is often secured for projects of 
lower national priority and utilised in an inefficient manner. Policy-makers need to 
concentrate on the effectiveness of foreign aid. It is, however, suggested that reasonable 
shares of foreign assistance and domestic revenues should be used for development 
activities so as to achieve sustainable long-term economic growth. 
The paper also suggests that further empirical work on the fiscal behaviour of the 
public sector may be useful to policy-makers. In this perspective, a further 
disaggregation of the public revenues and expenditures, with better specification of the 
determinants of each and further breakdown of foreign assistance (i.e., foreign aid and 
grants, bilateral and multilateral aid, tied and untied loans), may provide stronger results 
for better policy formulation. In addition, the assumptions made in the analysis can also 
be relaxed in further work in the area.   
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